Education and selective vouchers by Piolatto, Amedeo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Education and selective vouchers
Amedeo Piolatto
Universidad de Alicante - Dep.to Fundamento del Analisis
Economico, Toulouse School of Economics - GREMAQ, Universita`
degli Studi di Milano Bicocca
March 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19407/
MPRA Paper No. 19407, posted 21. December 2009 06:12 UTC
useless line to increase top margin
Education and selective vouchers
∗
17th December 2009
Amedeo Piolatto ∗∗
U. de Alicante
Abstract
A widely accepted result in the literature is that the majority of voters
are against the introduction of universal vouchers. Chen and West (2000)
predict that voters’ attitudes towards selective vouchers (SV) may be differ-
ent. Their claim is that voters are indifferent between the no-voucher and
SV regimes, unless competition leads to a reduction in the education price.
This paper shows that, when public schools are congested, the majority
of voters are in favour of SV. Furthermore, SV induces a Pareto improve-
ment. In equilibrium, the introduction of SV induces a reduction in income
stratification at school, with some relatively poor students attending private
schools.
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1 Introduction
Most Western countries publicly provide some private goods, such as education,
financed through taxes and offered to citizens at a lower-than-competitive price.
Households can choose between the public and private supplies.
Legal or technical reasons may prevent households from consuming both the
publicly and the privately provided good, a common assumption in the education
literature. At first-best, consumers’ choice of quality of instruction is heterogen-
eous. For equity reasons, all students in a public school receive the same service,
regardless of their preferences.
Resources available to finance education are limited, as is the variety of edu-
cation offered. Public schools may be congested.1 In that case, incentives to
move to the private sector reduce congestion, relax the public budget constraint,
and increase agents’ decisional space. Meanwhile, political support for a high-
quality public service may decrease. Vouchers provide an incentive to attend
private schools;2 their use was recently discussed and implemented in a variety
of countries (Chile was amongst the first; the Czech Republic one of the last).
The introduction of vouchers often encounters strong ideological opposition;3
I use a political economy model to investigate how citizens would perceive the
introduction of a voucher system. A voting model seems appropriate to forecast
how voters would perceive changes in the level of taxation and the use of vouchers.4
The idea behind the model is that public school students receive a sub-optimal
level of instruction. A voucher allowing them to attend a private school induces
some voters to opt out of the public sector and choose the optimal budget share
to devote to education. When vouchers are only proposed to people that would
otherwise attend public school, it is possible to relax public budget constraint by
proposing a voucher with value below the cost of public school students. That way,
by revealed preferences, people opting out of the public sector are better off. At
equilibrium, this increases the quality of public school and reduces the tax burden,
making the other voters better off as well.
A broad part of the literature concludes that vouchers do not improve welfare
1Clearly, public schools are not always congested. This point is discussed in the next section.
2Vouchers are either “universal” (everybody receives them) or “selective” (only a subset of
the population is eligible).
3For instance, see Card and Krueger (1992), Filer and Munich (2001), McEwan and Carnoy
(2002) or Chakrabarti (2008).
4Most modern Western democracies are indirect, while I consider a direct voting model. With
office-motivated politicians, the choice of the legislator coincides with the preferred policy by the
majority of voters. See also Budge (2006).
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or that the majority of citizens are against their introduction (unless additional
concerns, such as peer effects, are introduced). In a broad range of frameworks,
I show the following: 1) their introduction benefits the majority of society; 2)
an office-motivated politician should be in favour of their instauration; and 3) in
many cases, their introduction can lead to a Pareto improvement.
The literature on the political economy of education is extensive;5 Epple and
Romano (1996) is often the departure point (including in my contribution). Edu-
cation is a consumption good.6 Agents, who have heterogenous income, vote over
the tax rate to finance public schools; differences in consumption are in terms of
quality. An equilibrium may fail to exist. Epple and Romano (1996) identify two
single crossing conditions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium: Slope
Rising in Income (SRI) and Slope Decreasing in Income (SDI).7 Under SRI, the
“ends against the middle” equilibrium implies that the richest and poorest house-
holds push to reduce the tax, while the middle class does the opposite. Under
SDI, the median voter is decisive, and the poorest half of society forms a coalition
against the richest half. Vouchers are not considered.
Chen and West (2000) use Epple and Romano (1996)’s structure to compare
systems with universal, selective and no vouchers, under SDI. The median in-
come is the upper threshold for receiving selective vouchers of value equal to the
(constant) marginal cost of education. They conclude that the majority always
prefers the no-voucher model to the universal one. The decisive voter is indifferent
between the selective and the no-voucher framework and there are no welfare dif-
ferences. The crucial assumptions are as follows: a) introducing vouchers does not
affect the market price; b) the marginal cost of producing education is constant;
and c) only agents with income below the median are entitled to vouchers. Section
III in Chen and West (2000) acknowledges that an increase in competition may
lead to a fall in the market price or an increase in quality and, thus, to an increase
in welfare. This last result is in line with those of my paper.
Epple and Romano (1998) consider a universal vouchers model with students
differing in income and ability. They conclude that a majority of voters supports
universal vouchers and that vouchers reduce congestion. Their results rely on
5Stiglitz (1974) is one of the most well known. Other important contributions come from
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Blomquist and Christiansen (1999), Chen and West (2000),
De Fraja (2002), Gradstein and Justman (2002) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006). The
Handbook of the Economics of Education (2006) and Gradstein, Justman, and Meier (2005)
provide surveys of a consistent part of the recent literature on the field.
6See Dur and Glazer (2008).
7See footnote 9 and page 7 for more details on these conditions.
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the presence of peer effects. Rich or skilled students attend private schools. A
minority of neither rich nor skilled students remains in public schools, where the
quality drops along with students’ utility. The authors develop a computational
model, calibrated to existing empirical evidence.
Similarly to Chen and West (2000), I consider selective vouchers as a possible
way to reduce congestion (reducing the price of private education, vouchers allow
some voters to consume it) and to increase quality in the public sector. The differ-
ences in results with respect to Chen and West (2000) come from the attributes of
the vouchers: more people are entitled to use them and their value is equal to the
average cost of public school students. The market structure and the cost function
in my model are similar to those in Epple and Romano (1998).
Agents vote on the tax to finance public schooling. The cost of public and
private education do not need to be the same. As in Chen and West (2000), I
do not consider peer effects,8 and I also focus on the SDI condition.9 Absent
vouchers, the results are identical to those in Epple and Romano (1996), which I
use as a benchmark. My model shows that, in the extreme case, the public sector
collapses when the share of public school students attracted by vouchers exceeds
a given threshold. In this case, a minority of the population may be worse off. In
the more realistic case in which public education is not undermined, introducing
vouchers is Pareto improving.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the model, Section
3 illustrates the voting outcome without vouchers (benchmark case). Section 4
studies the effects of introducing vouchers, while Section 5 analyses the results of
the vote over the tax and show under which conditions selective vouchers induce
a Pareto improvement. The last section concludes.
8This is not just a simplifying assumption; the literature is unclear about how peer effects
operate. Among others, Zimmerman (2003) finds small peer effects in many, but not all, circum-
stances. Moreover, the phenomenon is limited to verbal (and not mathematical) proficiency and
only concerns students of “medium ability”. Burke and Sass (2008) find that peer effects among
students are statistically not significant when accounting for those among professors. McEwan
(2003) finds that peer effects in Chile are not significant when accounting for the mothers’ level
of education. Besides, it is unclear whether peer effects have an impact on efficiency, or if only
redistribution is concerned.
9The SDI (Slope Decreasing in Income) condition means that agents’ preferred tax decreases
with income. Between SRI and SDI, it is still not clear which is more likely. Epple and Romano
suggest that SRI is more appropriate, while Justman supports the opposite assumption. The SDI
assumption derives from a substitution effect that prevails on the income effect and vice versa
for the SRI assumption. The SRI assumption is more reasonable for countries where the living
conditions of the poorest citizens are dramatic in absolute terms (children tend not to attend
school). Thus, education has a small impact on poor people’s utility. SDI is more appropriate
for countries where poor people are sufficiently rich to consider education as an investment.
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2 The model
I consider a model with two normal goods: the numeraire b and education X:
1. Attendance to public and private schools are mutually exclusive. Subscript
P indicates the public sector and R the private sector (e.g., XP and XR are
respectively the qualities of public and private education).
2. The mass of voters is normalised to 1. Each voter has a pupil of school
age. Voters type depends solely on income ω, distributed with density f
on the support [ωmin, ωmax]. I assume the average (and aggregate) income
ω =
∫ ωmax
ωmin
ωf(ω)dω to be greater than the median one (ωmed).
3. Voters’ utility function, U(X, b), is separable and strictly concave in X.10
4. To incorporate congestion in the model, the school cost function is convex
in the number of students n: C(X, n) = F + V (n)X, with V ′(n) ≥ 0 and
V ′′(n) ≥ 0. In particular, I assume V (n) = c1n + c2(n)
2; thus, the cost
function is C(X, n) = F + (c1n+ c2(n)
2)X.11
5. The public sector is the dominant firm, while the private sector is the com-
petitive fringe. The shape of the cost function is the same for both the public
and private sectors. Without loss of generality, I assume that only one public
institute is present.12 Each private school student decides the level of edu-
cational quality to purchase. Low barriers to entry ensure that the number
of students in each school adjusts to the efficient scale (i.e., for each firm i,
ni = argmin(
C(X,ni)
ni
)). The quality of one unit of private education XR is
defined in order to normalise the private sector’s price to one.13
6. Public education is financed via a proportional income tax t paid by all
citizens and chosen through majority voting. Without loss of generality, I
10This is slightly more restrictive than the assumption ensuring the single crossing property in
Epple and Romano (1996); the subsequent computations are simplified by this assumption, but
results and insights are not affected.
11Subsection 2.1 discusses this assumption.
12This is equivalent to assuming that public schools are of equal size and provide the same
service. This occurs with perfectly mobile students (arbitrage effect), even with the presence
of idiosyncratic heterogeneity (e.g., different average wealth) and peer effects (whose analysis is
beyond the scope of this work).
13By the free entry assumption, the price of private school does not depend on the number of
students in the private sector. Chen and West (2000) arrives at the same conclusion through a
generic technology to produce education showing decreasing returns to scale. Epple and Romano
(1996) do not specify the private sector market structure.
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suppose that the public budget constraint requires balancing only ordinary
(variable) costs and the proportional income tax proceeds.14
7. Tax proceeds are first used to finance vouchers.15 The remaining resources
are shared equally among public school students (thus, all students attending
public school receive the same quality of education XP ).
8. The value v of vouchers and agents eligible to use them are exogenously
determined. The public cost of vouchers is nvv, where nv is the number of
people using vouchers in equilibrium.16
By assumption 6, total public (variable) expenditure (c1 + c2np)npXP + nvv
must equal tax proceeds tω. Rearranging the budget constraint, the quality of
public schools is defined by:
XP =
tω − nvv
gnp
(1)
where g = (c1+c2np) is the per-pupil cost of one unit of public education. Clearly,
since XP cannot be negative, we must ensure that tω ≥ nvv.
The convexity assumption plays an important role in the model. I discuss my
choice in subsection 2.1, and in the concluding section I introduce two alternative
assumptions leading to the same results when the cost function is linear.
2.1 On the convexity of the cost function
Many empirical researches tried to determine the shape of the cost function for
education, but results are controversial. While some authors find evidence of eco-
nomies of scale and of scope (Lenton (2008), Ledyard (2004) and (2005)), examples
of congestion are found by Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995), Kokkelenberg,
14In other words, I suppose fixed costs to be covered by ad hoc lump sum taxes. Fixed costs are
infrequent and large. Thus, they might have to be approved by specific procedures and financed
through special public funds. This assumption has no qualitative effect on the results.
15Fixing a minimal expenditure for public schools might imply a higher preferred tax, but it
would not qualitatively affect the outcome. The alternative (i.e., having total income shared
between vouchers and public school) would reduce tractability without adding special insights.
16It may appear arbitrary to vote over the tax to finance school only, excluding vouchers’ value
and who is eligible. This is not a simplifying assumption; the voting mechanism is intended as
a way to predict the attitude of an “office-motivated” politician. Political support depends on
the policies implemented on sensible topics: voters are interested in general policies (such as
the share of GDP devoted to education), while they do not have a clear position on technical
problems (such as the value of the voucher) requiring the collection of much information. For
instance, the Swiss referendum was only on the introduction of vouchers. Their value and who
could profit from them were chosen by politicians.
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Dillon, and Christy (2008), Ruggiero (1999), Smet (2001) andWo¨ssmann and West
(2006). Also Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) seem
to support the idea of a convex cost function. Concerning the role of classes size
in education effectiveness, Lazear (2001) writes that “Blake (1954) summarised
a literature where 35 studies found smaller class size was better, 18 found larger
class size was better, and 32 were inconclusive.”
Congestion is not the only justification for a convex cost function: the precise
definition of educational services plays a major role in that. When considering
teaching, a non-convex cost function is more likely. Conversely, modern schools
provide numerous facilities including libraries, computer rooms, sport facilities, etc.
Transportation costs, often non linear, also matter in the choice of the optimal size
of a school.
The empirical paper by Smet (2001) considers education in Belgium. After
separating the cost of teaching and the other costs education related (and trans-
portation costs, in particular), Smet shows that the cost function is U-shaped,
which implies on the one side that there is an optimal size for schools. On the
other, when the size of a school is excessive, the cost of education increases more
than proportionally with the number of students.
Chubb and Moe (1990), and the empirical work in Ruggiero (1999) about the
state of New York, conclude that public schools are not efficient and that they do
not minimise costs (i.e., the cost function is convex in the number of students and
the size of school is not optimally chosen).
To sum up, a non-convex cost function seems to be a reasonable assumption
when considering lecturing, while convexity is justified when analysing the entire
bundle. In particular, the transportation costs of both students and employees
to and within the school, the management and organisational costs, monitoring
costs and costs to guarantee the security within the school are important sources
of convexity.
In my model, I consider the cost of providing the whole bundle, which explains
why I believe it is reasonable to assume that the cost function is convex. In the
conclusion I show that this assumption is less crucial than it looks and two other
can replace it.
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2.2 Households’ behaviour
• The problem of an agent choosing private school is17 maxXR U(XR, b)s.t. b = (1− t)ω −max{XR − v; 0}
The indirect utility (in reduced form) is UR(X∗R, (1− t)ω −max{X
∗
R − v}),
where X∗R is the optimal level of consumption of private education. Not
profiting from public education, his preferred tax rate if he uses vouchers is
t = nvv
ω
(the minimum tax to finance them) and t = 0 otherwise. His utility
is strictly decreasing with the tax.
• The utility function of an agent of income ω attending public school is
U(XP , b); replacing b with the after tax income and XP with Equation 1,
the indirect utility is:
UP
(
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
)
(2)
The tax rate t∗(ω) = argmax
t
UP
(
tω−nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
maximises agent’s utility.
The preferred tax depends on income; from the FOC changes are measured impli-
citly. By the separability of U , ∂t
∗(ω)
∂ω
> 0 (SRI) if and only if −ω(1− t)UP22 > U
P
2
and ∂t
∗(ω)
∂ω
< 0 (SDI) if and only if −ω(1− t)UP22 < U
P
2 .
18
Both conditions, widely accepted in the literature, refer to agents attending
public school; I assume that the SDI assumption holds. This assumption means
that the marginal utility of education is larger than that of the numeraire for low
income voters, and smaller for high income agents. As a consequence, richer people
are less eager to substitute units of the numeraire for education.
Each agent chooses between public and private school by comparing the two
levels of utility that he can attain. It is possible to identify the “indifferent
voter(s)” ω̂, i.e., the voter(s) having the same utility regardless of the type of
school attended:
UR (X∗R, (1− t)ω −max{X
∗
R − v, 0}) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
. (3)
17Remember that the price of private education q is normalised to 1.
18Monotonicity conditions ensure the existence of an equilibrium. For more on the SRI and
SDI assumptions, see footnote 9 or Epple and Romano (1996).
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The identity of ω̂ depends on public school quality and thus on the equilibrium
tax t. Since the equilibrium tax depends on the identity of the pivotal voter ω, it
is more precise to denote the indifferent voter by ω̂(ω).
From the following two lemmas, once we identify the indifferent voter, all richer
agents attend private school and the others attend public school.19
Lemma 1 In a given interval ω ∈ [α, ϕ] and for α < β < ϕ, if the agent ω = β
prefers the private system so do all those richer than him (i.e., ω ∈ [β, ϕ]).
Lemma 2 Similarly to the previous lemma, if ω = β prefers the public system, so
do all the poorer agents (i.e., ω ∈ [α, β]).
The intuition is that the choice between public and private education depends
on the marginal rate of substitution (monotone in income) between education and
the numeraire. When an agent is sufficiently rich for private school to be preferable
(because the reduction in consumption of b has minor effects), this is true a fortiori
for all richer agents. Similarly, if an agent prefers public school, then poorer people
prefer it too.
Figure 1: Moving from public to private school: Engel’s and indifference curves
The indifferent agent can choose between two bundles: attending public school
(point 4 in Figure 1) he can consume more of the numeraire but less education
than desirable (point 3) and vice versa (the centre and left charts in fig. 1 show the
jump in consumption), since agents pay the tax financing the public school also
when attending private school. From the sketch of the indifference curves (right
chart in Figure 1),20, for an agent with low income (ω < ωˆ), and in particular
19This is true, provided we compare agents all receiving a voucher or if none of them did it.
20The vertical dashed line in correspondence to the point Xp shows the possibility of con-
sumption jump when switching from private to public school. The dotted line represents, with
homothetic preferences, the income expansion path.
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for the median voter, it is preferable to attend public school (2 ≻ 1). Voter ωˆ
is indifferent between public and private instruction (3 ∼ωˆ 4). Finally, for those
agents with sufficiently large income (ω > ωˆ), the point of tangency suggests that
the private schooling is preferred.
Before considering the solution of the model, I consider the situation when
vouchers are not available, a benchmark to study the consequences of the intro-
duction of vouchers.
3 The benchmark case: no vouchers
Absent vouchers, this model differs from Epple and Romano (1996) only in that the
cost function parameters can differ from the public to the private sector.21 Equilib-
rium results for the no-voucher case are denoted by the superscript nv. Equation
1 becomes Xnvp =
tω
gnvnnvp
and 3 is UR (X∗R, (1− t)ω −X
∗
R) = U
P
(
tω
gnvnnvp
, (1− t)ω
)
.
Figure 2: Preferred tax under SDI and no voucher (linear proxy)
Under the SDI assumption, the median voter is pivotal (ω = ωmed) (see Fig-
ure 2).22 This means that the voting outcome in the no-voucher case is tnv =
t(ωmed); all and only agents with income lower than the indifferent voter ω̂ attend
public school. The number of households attending public school is nnvp (t
nv) =∫ ω̂
ωmin
f(ω)dω = F (ω̂).23
21For more details and proofs of this section results, the reader can see Epple and Romano
(1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
22As the preferred tax is weakly decreasing in income, the poorer households prefer a larger
tax than the richer ones; t < t(ωmed) cannot be an equilibrium because households with income
ω < ωmed prefer t(ωmed), nor can t > t(ωmed), which is defeated by a majority including agents
with income ω ≥ ωmed.
23Agents take nnvp (and thus the quality of public instruction) as given and vote for the tax
level. In equilibrium, the proportion of voters opting for public services coincides with agents’
expectations. Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)’s proposition 2 (proving that a value for nnvp always
exists that solves 3 and that this value is unique) holds in this framework. The conditions under
which Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)’s proposition 2 holds are not restrictive: the cumulative
density function F (ω) has to be continuous and increasing in ω.
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In my article, compared to Epple and Romano (1996), public and private school
prices (respectively g and q) can differ. Their results for the SDI case hold assuming
g = q. When g 6= q, their results are still qualitatively applicable; but the identity
of the indifferent voter changes. Relative to Epple and Romano (1996), if g > q,
the quality of public school is lower, and so is ω̂ (i.e., the indifferent agent between
public and private school is poorer); the opposite is true for g < q.
4 Introducing vouchers
Agents with income below ωvmax = ω̂(t
nv(ωmed)) are entitled to use a voucher of
magnitude v = t
nvω
nnvp
if they attend a private school;24 the two values were arbitrar-
ily chosen: v is equal to the voucher-absent average cost of a public school student;
ωvmax is the income of the indifferent agent under no vouchers. This ensures that
agents attending private schools anyway are not subsidised, and it simplifies com-
parisons with the no-voucher framework.
The public budget constraint 1 can be rewritten as
XP =
(
t−
nv
nnvp
tnv
)
ω
gnp
(4)
We expect some of the agents entitled to receive a voucher to shift to the
private sector. This implies a reduction in congestion. Thus, the quality of public
school increases, possibly attracting some students who previously attended private
schools.
Since the price of private education is no longer the same for all agents, we
identify up to two possible indifferent agents: one among voters receiving vouchers
and another within the others.
It is preferable to consider the two groups [ωmin, ω
v
max] and [ω
v
max, ωmax] separ-
ately. Lemmas 1 and 2 allow us to construct four (possibly empty) subsets:25 in
particular, for each of the two previous groups of agents, some voters may prefer
public education and others the private one.
24By the decreasing returns to scale assumption, the value of the voucher is strictly smaller
than the marginal cost of a student in equilibrium in the case without vouchers, i.e., t
nvω
nnvp
<
(c1+2c2n
nv
p )t
nvω
(c1+c2nnvp )n
nv
p
.
25Later, I state the existence conditions for the indifferent agents and the bounds of the four
subsets’.
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ω̂L(t) ∈ [ωmin, ω
v
max] is the income level for which
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R + v) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
, (5)
while ω̂R(t) ∈ [ω
v
max;ωmax] is such that
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
. (6)
Equations 5 and 6 mean that agents with income ω̂L and ω̂R are indifferent between
private and public education; ω̂L + v ≤ ω̂ ≤ ω̂R.
Figure 3 shows how utility changes with income for an agent attending private
or public school, both with and without vouchers. The quality of public school in
the graph is fixed and Xp > X
nv
p .
Figure 3: How utility changes with income
If UR(ω + v) and UP (Xp, ω) were crossing to the right with respect to U
R(ω)
and UP (Xnvp , ω), than ω̂L would be greater than ω̂ and would not belong to the
required interval; all agents in [ωmin, ω
v
max] would attend public school. Likewise,
all agents with income greater than ω̂ prefer private education when UR(ω) and
UP (Xp, ω) do not cross to the right of ω̂. When both thresholds exist, there are
four groups of agents, whose preferred choice is represented in Figure 4.
Given ω̂L and ω̂R,
26 the number of agents using the voucher in equilibrium is
nv =
∫ ω̂(tnv)
ω̂L
f(ω)dω while the number of agents attending public school is
np =
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω̂R
ω̂(tnv)
f(ω)dω (7)
26The number nnvp of people attending public school in the no-voucher case is defined on page
9.
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Figure 4: Intervals and choices
The following propositions prove that ω̂L ∈ [ωmin, ω
v
max] and ω̂R ∈ [ω
v
max, ωmax].
Proofs follow in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 For all t ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ R++, there always exists a value for
np ∈ (0, 1) for which the number of people willing to attend public school is equal
to the one that agents anticipate to solve their maximisation problem.
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If, ceteris paribus, the quality of public school increases, the pre-
ferred tax for a given level of income falls. Thus the same pivotal voter might
choose different tax rates according to the framework.
Corollary 1 If Xp > X
nv
p , then t(ωmed) < t
nv(ωmed).
This means that, if the median voter is pivotal both with and without vouchers,
the tax burden decreases if introducing vouchers increases the quality of public
schooling. Corollary 1 has an important welfare implication, since a reduction in
t generates an increase in all agents’ welfare, including private school students.
Proposition 3 If ω̂L = ω̂, then ω̂R = ω̂ and we are back to the case without
vouchers. Moreover it cannot be that ω̂L > ω̂.
Intuitively, an agent who (voucher-absent) prefers private school, move to the
public sector only if the quality of public school increased. Public school at-
tendance in the vouchers regime is weakly smaller than in the no-voucher one:
gnp ≤ g
nvnnvp with strict inequality if ω̂L < ω̂. As long as (and only when) ω̂L < ω̂,
the introduction of vouchers modifies the equilibrium, reducing the number of
public school students.
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Proposition 4 ω̂R > ω̂ if and only if XP > X
nv
p : some agents move, after the
introduction of vouchers, from the private to the public sector, only if the quality of
public school increased as a consequence of the change. If Xp ≤ X
nv
p , then ω̂R = ω̂.
The median voter’s preferred tax is the largest supported by at least half of
the population); the equilibrium one can never be larger. Since ω̂R > ω̂ only when
Xp > X
nv
p , if we observe ω̂R > ω̂, the total number of agents attending public
school is necessarily smaller than without vouchers (np < n
nv
p ).
Proposition 5 Public-school-quality at the equilibrium under vouchers is always
greater or equal to the one without vouchers (given the tax rate), i.e., Xp ≥ X
nv
p ,
with strict inequality when ω̂L < ω̂.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proofs.
By propositions 1 to 5, there are two possible scenarios after introducing vouch-
ers: a) nobody uses vouchers and the introduction does not affect agents in the
economy, that is ω̂L = ω̂R = ω
v
max; or b) the richest people entitled to use vouchers
and the poorest who are not eligible both adjust their behaviour: ω̂L < ω
v
max < ω̂R.
5 The vote over the tax
Households chose the tax rate through a majority vote. Agents’ preferred tax de-
pends on the choice between public and private education, and on the opportunity
to receive a voucher. Recall that:
• the preferred tax rate is decreasing in income (SDI assumption).
• the preferred tax is t = 0 for private school students not using vouchers.
• t = nvv
ω
is the preferred tax of private school students using vouchers. This
is the tax needed to finance vouchers.27 With this level of taxation, strictly
lower than the one preferred by any public school student, public education
disappears.
The voting outcome depends on the distribution of income and on whether the
median voter attends public school. I analyse the following cases separately: i)
(Subsection 5.1) where the median voter attends public school after the introduc-
tion of vouchers (ω̂L ≥ ωmed) and vouchers induce a Pareto improvement; and ii)
27Vouchers’ value is fixed; voting for a larger tax rate is not rational.
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(Subsection 5.2) where the median voter uses the voucher to move to the private
sector (ω̂L < ωmed) and we observe a Pareto improvement only if the public school
system does not collapse.
5.1 The median voter attends a public school (ω̂L ≥ ωmed)
Focusing on when ω̂L ∈ [ωmed, ω̂),
28 the outcome of the vote is precisely t = t(ωmed).
Agents with income ω < ωmed (half of the population) ask for a tax increase with
respect to t = t(ωmed), while the others favour a decrease in the equilibrium tax:
the median voter is pivotal. Figure 5 represents agents’ preferred tax in the case
of vouchers when ω̂L ≥ ωmed.
Figure 5: Agents’ preferred tax
Even though the median voter is decisive, his preferred tax rate is lower than
in the no-voucher case by Proposition 2: t(ωmed) < t
nv(ωmed). The public budget
constraint is relaxed and the quality of public school necessarily increases.29 This
effect is partially offset by the arrival of new students, who previously attended
private school and are attracted by the higher public school quality; the subset
ω ∈ [ω̂, ω̂R] is non-empty. By Proposition 4, the number of agents moving out
from public school is larger than the number of students moving into it and the
final effect is an increase in the quality of the public service (financed through tax
proceeds net of vouchers expenditure).
28If ω̂L = ω̂ (i.e., vouchers are not attractive), we are back to the no-voucher case (proposition
3).
29Since the voucher’s value is below marginal cost, convincing students to move to the private
sector relaxes the public budget constraint, increasing the quality of the public service.
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From a welfare standpoint, we observe a Pareto improvement. The quality
of public schools increases when vouchers are introduced, making public school
students better off. Moreover, the tax burden falls, so all citizens are better off. By
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP), all agents changing behaviour
while the previous bundle is still affordable must be better off.
To be more rigorous, for ω̂L < ω̂, utility increases for all agents when introdu-
cing vouchers:
• [ωmin, ω̂L]: these agents always opt for public school. The quality of public
school increases (Proposition 5). Since their disposable income and the public
school quality increase, their utility increases as well.
• [ω̂L, ω̂R): they either move from public to private education, using vouchers,
or from private to public (ω ∈ (ω̂, ω̂R)). For all of them, the bundle previously
consumed is still affordable. They all have a larger disposable income and
the quality of public school increased. If they modify their choice, the new
bundle is preferred to the previous one by WARP.
• [ω̂R, ωmax]: all the agents in this interval attend private school in both cases.
The price that they pay to attend private school is the same, and the tax
decreases. As a consequence, they are better off in the voucher case.
To sum up, when the introduction of vouchers is ineffective (i.e., ω̂L = ω̂ = ω̂R),
agents are indifferent, and for ω̂L ∈ [ωmed, ω̂), the selective voucher system strictly
Pareto dominates the no-voucher system.
5.2 The median voter attends a private school (ω̂L < ωmed)
According to the density function f(ω), the number of people affected by the
introduction of vouchers (ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂R] ) varies, as does the number of agents
willing to use vouchers in equilibrium. The consequence of introducing vouchers
depends on how many agents move to private schooling.
If ω̂L(ωmed) < ωmed, the poorest part of the population (which attends public
school) cannot form a majority coalition. The shift from public to private induced
by vouchers (ceteris paribus) increases the quality of public service, which attracts
a group of voters (ω ∈ [ω, ω̂R]) previously attending a private school. Two scenarios
can occur depending on whether or not those willing to attend public school make
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up at least half of the population (i.e.,
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω̂R
ω̂
f(ω)dω ≥ 50%). The
value of vouchers and f(ω) jointly determine which is the relevant scenario.30
Let us define the pivotal voter as
ω =
{
ω ∈ (ω̂, ω̂R] :
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω = 50%
}
(8)
where we restrict the existence of ω to the interval (ω̂, ω̂R], to ensure that he is
attending a public school.31 Intuitively, the income ω represents the agent whose
preferred tax is the “median preferred-tax”. Agents’ preferred tax is summarised
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Agents’ preferred tax
The existence of ω implies that a coalition of public school students set the
equilibrium tax and that the group in favour of having no tax does not influence
the vote outcome. If no one income fulfils the requirements in Equation 8, the tax
is chosen by the group of agents attending private school and profiting from the
voucher (and set to the minimum level to finance vouchers: t = nvv
ω
).
The equilibrium when the majority of voters attend public school By
construction, ω is pivotal: agents with income in the interval [ωmin, ω̂L] ∪ [ω̂ , ω]
30Note that in all countries in which vouchers have been introduced, public school attendance
exceeds half of the population. For instance, in Chile, where vouchers’ value was set slightly below
the average cost of students attending public school (OECD (1998)), private school attendance
grew from 25% to 39% (Cox and Lemaitre (1999)).
31
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω = 50% is equivalent to
∫ ωmed
ω̂L
f(ω)dω =
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω.
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(representing half of the population) prefer a tax rate larger than the one chosen
by ω. Agents in [ω̂L, ω̂] and [ω, ω̂R] ask for a lower but positive tax rate; the
remaining (ω > ω̂R) ask for no tax at all. By the SDI assumption, since ω > ωmed,
the equilibrium tax decreases with respect to those in Sections 3 and 5.1.
From Equation 8, ω̂ < ω ≤ ω̂R. By Proposition 4 we can conclude that
quality of public education has necessarily increased and, thus, that a strict Pareto
improvement occurred.
All agents’ disposable income increases (t(ω) < tnv(ωmed)); agents attending a
private school (i.e., ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂] and ω > ω̂R) are better off with vouchers. The
poorest agents (ω < ω̂L) are also better off, since they pay less in taxes and receive
a better public service.
People in ω ∈ [ω̂, ω̂R] could stick to the private market and consume a better
bundle with respect to the one consumed without vouchers (since the tax de-
creased); if they move to the public sector, the WARP allows us to conclude that
they are better off.
Because all agents are strictly better off, we conclude that the introduction of
vouchers leads to a strict Pareto improvement.
The equilibrium when the majority of voters do not attend public school
When agents willing to attend public school are less than 50%, the decisive voter
belongs to the group of private school students profiting from the voucher. The
minimum tax to finance vouchers for all agents entitled to receive them (t =
nnvp v
ω
)
wins any pair wise comparison. Replacing v by its value, we obtain t =
nnvp v
ω
= tnv.
Every former student of the public school receives the average social cost of a
public student in the no voucher case.
For this solution to represent a stable equilibrium, at least half of the population
has to be better off; otherwise, this tax rate cannot win against the proposal of
having no vouchers. All people with income ω > ω̂ are indifferent, since the tax
does not change with respect to the benchmark.
People with income ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂] are always better off (by WARP).
Concerning people with income ω < ω̂L, they all receive the same voucher, to
be spent for private education. There are three possible frameworks:
1. The private school market price (q) is lower than the average cost of produ-
cing public education (AC(XP )) in the no-voucher case. It is socially optimal
to dismantle the public school and distribute vouchers. Agents are better
off, this solution is a Pareto improving, and public schooling disappears.
17
2. q = AC(XP ). Agents are indifferent. This equilibrium weakly Pareto dom-
inates the no-voucher case and public schooling disappears.
3. q > AC(XP ). Voters with income ω < ω̂L are worse off (their consumption
of the numeraire is constant, but they receive worse educational service).
A minority of the population is worse off (ω < ω̂L), another is better off
(ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂]) and the remainder (ω > ω̂) is indifferent. For this framework
to constitute an equilibrium (i.e., for voters to accept the introduction of
vouchers), at least half of voters should agree on vouchers, which means that
a substantial part of the richest agents must form a coalition with the middle
class against the lower class.
6 Conclusions
I investigate the implications of introducing selective vouchers and, in particular,
whether the majority of voters would accept this change. I show that:
1. the usual conclusion that the median voter is always decisive under SDI is
not robust with regard to the introduction of vouchers.
2. in addition to the known coalition types (poor versus rich, and middle class
versus the others), a third type of coalition can form. In this coalition, part
of the bottom-middle class joins the richest agents, to ask for a reduction in
taxes. Meanwhile, the top-middle class forms a coalition with the poorest
voters in order to increase taxes.
3. introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement unless this pro-
vokes the public sector collapse. Meanwhile, the market price of private edu-
cation is higher than the average cost of producing public education. In this
case, the poorest in the population are hurt by vouchers.
4. a large majority should always support selective vouchers.
5. the middle class is the group that directly profits from vouchers; the poorest
class bears their costs when public education disappears. The richest class
weakly profits from the introduction of vouchers (through tax reductions).
The results, at first sight, rely on the diseconomies of scale assumption. The
conclusions are identical under the assumption of a non-decreasing marginal cost
if the value of the voucher is below marginal cost and one of the following two
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assumptions hold: 1) agents’ preferences toward private school are heterogeneous;
2) preferences are homothetic and some of the agents with income greater than
the median are entitled to receive vouchers.
If private schools provide additional services valuable to a subset of the popu-
lation (religion or ethnical classes, for instance), the willingness to pay for private
school is no longer proportional to income. Providing vouchers to agents that
otherwise attend public school would induce some of them to move to the private
sector. If the voucher costs less than the extra cost to the public system of the
marginal student, the total per-capita budget for students attending public school
would increase, reproducing the same mechanism as above. However, the people
moving from and to the public sector would not necessarily be those with income
in [ω̂L, ω̂R].
When preferences are homothetic, we see from Figure 1 that all agents with
income [ωmed, ω̂] would be better off with vouchers. Point α in Figure 1 shows
the optimal bundle of one agent with income in [ωmed, ω̂], if public school is not
available. Point µ and point ρ are the optimal points under no-voucher and voucher
respectively. Under this scheme, some agents in [ωmed, ω̂] would move to the private
sector. This would trigger the virtuous mechanism again (in this case, it is even
possible to rule out the case in which public school disappears).
We conclude that the introduction of vouchers should never be harmful for
society (unless public school collapses). This is true when their value is below or
equal to the average per-student public expenditure and students that would have
attended a private school in any case are not eligible for vouchers. Of course, this
result depends on the following initial specifications: 1) education is considered a
horizontally differentiated good, and it is not harmful for society to have people at-
tending the school of their choice;32 and 2) peer effects are irrelevant (alternatively,
peer effects have a linear impact on instruction and the social welfare function is
utilitarian).
Introducing selective vouchers of fixed amount implies a jump in utility (i.e.,
a distortion) for agents whose income is close to the threshold for eligibility. This
is a structural problem of selective vouchers that can be avoided through intro-
ducing vouchers that are regressive in income. Further research may investigate
the conditions under which such vouchers would be compatible with public budget
constraint and allow an increase in welfare.
32If, for instance, a school were less effective in the spread of knowledge, increasing its market
share might have a negative impact on productivity, growth, etc.
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We also conclude that the introduction of vouchers increases integration in a
stratified society, increasing the variance in wealth among students in the same
school (making private schools accessible to poorer people and public schools more
attractive for wealthier people).
From these results, one might expect that voters would welcome the introduc-
tion of vouchers. Nevertheless, in many countries (especially in Europe), vouchers
are not popular, as demonstrated by the results of the Swiss referendum and the
Italian debate over the last years. A combination of different factors may have
generated this aversion. In many countries, private institutes have religious (and
sometimes political) orientations. Vouchers are perceived as a subsidy to a specific
credo or as a way to diffuse specific cultures or principles.
Another reason might be that, in general, only universal vouchers have been
proposed. These are more likely to decrease the quality of public service and
reduce redistribution.
Finally, a more substantial problem concerns the value of the voucher. A
voucher of a small amount is ineffective, and a too large amount implies that
public provision is no longer supported by the majority of the population. In my
model, a benevolent social planner fixes the value of the voucher at a value that
relaxes the public budget constraint when some students participate. If we let
people decide the value of vouchers, we can expect different results. In particular,
it is possible for the vouchers’ value to be larger than the public school student’s
social cost, or so small that no one would be interested in using them.
Appendix
A The effects of a change in the tax
Most variables are affected by changes in the income tax. Intuitively, if the tax rate
falls, the first impact on the model is that public investment in education (tω) falls,
and agents’ disposable income ((1− t)ω) increases. Both effects imply that opting
for private school becomes more attractive. Concerning the first effect, the reasons
are obvious, while for the second one, they are slightly more subtle: an increase in
the disposable income leads to an increase in the consumption of b for everybody,
but since the quantity of b consumed by people attending public school is higher,
by the concavity of the utility function, the increase in utility for people attending
public school is lower than the utility for those preferring private education. Since
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private school becomes more attractive, a greater number of agents switch from the
public to the private system (which means that the income of the two indifferent
voters decreases). The number of voters using vouchers increases, tightening even
more the public budget constraint. Simultaneously, with the number of people
attending public school having fallen, the per-capita public expenditure increases
(since gnp drops), making public education more attractive.
To summarise, the impact on the quality of public school from a change in
the tax is a priori undetermined: the budget available for public school is lower;
meanwhile, the number of people attending public school decreases (both because
public school becomes less attractive and because agents’ disposable income in-
creases). When ∂Xp
∂t
≥ 0, it means that a reduction in the tax rate decreases public
expenditure for education and the consequent shrinkage in the number of people
attending public school is not enough to offset it (demand for public school is in-
elastic); thus, the per-capita expenditure will also plunge. The reverse is true for
∂Xp
∂t
< 0.
B Proof of Proposition 1
At equilibrium, np has to solve two equations. On one side, it is equal to the
fraction of agents for whom the utility of attending a public school is larger than
the utility of opting out of it, thus np = µ{ω : U
P (t, ω, ω, np) ≥ U
R(t, ω, v),
where µ is the probability measure associated with the distribution function. On
the other hand (Equation 7), the number of agents with income in the interval
[ωmin, ω̂L] ∪ [ω̂, ω̂R] must be the same as the value for np used by agents to solve
their maximisation problem.
Equating the two, we obtain µ{ω : UP (t, ω, ω, np) ≥ U
R(t, ω, v) = F (ω̂L) +
(F (ω̂R)−F (ω̂)). Simple computations show that the left-hand side of the equation
is decreasing in both ω̂L and ω̂R while the right-hand side is increasing. Since F is
a continuous (and strictly increasing) function and since, for np = 0, the left-hand
side is always larger than the right-hand side, a unique solution exists (fixed point
theorem).
C Proof of Proposition 2
For a given revenue ω˜, the preferred tax t(ω˜) = argmax
t
UP ( tω−nvv
gnp
, (1−t)ω˜). If, for
any reason, the first argument (Xp) increases, its marginal utility of education (U
p
1 )
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decreases. At equilibrium, the optimal tax by definition equalises the marginal
utility of both arguments (Up1 = U
p
2 ), which means that the marginal utility of the
numeraire falls (thus, the numeraire consumption has to increase) and thus the
tax drops.
D Proof of Proposition 3
If ω̂L = ω̂, nobody uses the voucher, nv = 0 and Xp =
ωtnv
gnp
. The number of
students attending public school cannot be lower than in equilibrium in the no-
voucher case, which implies that gnp ≥ g
nvnnvp . This makes public school (weakly)
less attractive than in the no-voucher case, so all the households with income
ω > ω̂ (who were already preferring the private system) confirm their choice. If
XR ≻ω XP for all ω > ω̂, then g
nvnnvp = gnp and thus X
v
p = Xp and we are back
to the equilibrium case without vouchers.
Finally, it cannot be that ω̂L > ω̂. This would result in nv = 0 and g
vnvp = gnp;
this would imply that XnvP = XP and thus that ω̂L = ω̂, which is a contradiction.
This proves that ω̂L ≤ ω̂ in all cases.
E Proof of Proposition 4
XP > X
nv
P ⇐ ω̂R > ω̂: if ω̂R > ω̂ , agents in the interval (ω̂, ω̂R) are attending
public school in the presence of vouchers while they were attending private schools
before. The introduction of vouchers does not imply changes in the disposable
income of agents with income above ω̂; thus the original consumption bundle
remains affordable. By the WARP, if we observe a change in this agents’ behaviour,
it must be that the new bundle is preferred. Since the numeraire consumption
is constant, it must be that the quality of school consumed has increased, thus
XP > XR > X
nv
P .
XnvP = XP ⇒ ω̂R = ω̂: when X
nv
P = XP , for agents in (ω̂, ωmax] nothing has
changed. By simply replacing XP by X
nv
P in equation 6, we are back to the
condition in equation 3, and thus, by definition, the solution of the problem is ω̂.
XP > X
nv
P ⇒ ω̂R > ω̂: by definition, ω̂R is the level of income for which the left-
and right-hand sides of Equation 6 are equal. For XnvP = XP , ω̂R = ω̂. Increasing
XP , public school becomes more attractive (i.e., the right-hand side is bigger than
the left-hand side). Only an increase in the level of income can re-establish the
equality. Such an increase leads to a higher consumption of the numeraire both
22
in the case of consumption of public school and that of private school; given the
concavity of the utility function, the marginal increase is higher on the left-hand
side than on the right-hand side, which ensures that for a sufficiently large increase
in ω̂R, the equality holds once again.
F Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 3, ω̂L cannot be greater than ω̂. Two different scenarios are pos-
sible: ω̂L = ω̂ or ω̂L < ω̂.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose ω̂L < ω̂ and XP ≤ X
nv
P : by Proposition 4,
ω̂R = ω̂ and thus a) np = (np(t
nv) − nv), b) ωmed is decisive, c) t > t
nv and d)
g < gnv (since ω̂L < ω̂).
Then [
tnv
gnvnnvp
−
(
t− nv
nnvp
tnv
gnp
)]
ω > 0
a necessary condition for that (since t > tnv) is npg + nvg
nv > nnvp g
nv. For this
to be true it must be that g > gnv which is impossible.
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